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Abstract 
 
Standard theories of resource allocation within the household posit that parents’ 
investments in their children reflect a combination of children’s endowments and parents’ 
preferences for child quality. We study how changes in children’s cognitive endowments 
affect the distribution of parental investments amongst siblings, using data from a large-
scale iodine supplementation program in Tanzania. We find that parents strongly 
reinforce the higher cognitive endowments of children who received in utero iodine 
supplementation, by investing more in vaccinations and early life nutrition. The effect of 
siblings’ endowments on own investments depends on the extent to which quality across 
children is substitutable in parents’ utility functions. Neonatal investments, made before 
cognitive endowments become apparent to parents, are unaffected. Fertility is unaffected 
as well, suggesting that inframarginal quality improvements can spur investment 
responses even when the quantity-quality tradeoff is not readily observable. 
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 1 Introduction
A growing number of recent studies provide evidence that children’s “endowments” in early
life–for example, in health or cognitive ability–can have large effects on later-life health and eco-
nomic outcomes, some of which persist even into adulthood.1 It is natural to ask, then, how
household behaviors, particularly as relate to resource allocation amongst children, respond to
shifts in these endowments. Investments in children, as outcomes of the household’s alloca-
tion problem, are in general jointly determined by parents’ preferences for each child; the pro-
duction function for child quality; and the intra-household distribution of initial endowments.
Depending on the parameters of this allocation problem, parents may choose to reinforce or
compensate for initial endowments. The sign and magnitude of these behavioral responses indi-
cate whether–and by how much–parental investments magnify or dampen the biological effects
of early-life interventions. Moreover, these responses contain information about the extent to
which interventions targeting one child can have an impact on other children in the household
via shifts in the intra-household distribution of resources.
In this paper, we study the way in which health investments in children respond to changes
in their cognitive endowments, using variation induced by an iodine supplementation program
in Tanzania. The program, which came as a stopgap measure by the Tanzanian government
to curb the high rate of iodine deﬁciency, distributed iodized oil capsules in at-risk districts,
primarily targeting mothers of childbearing age and young children. We focus on the effects of
in utero exposure to iodine, because fetal iodine is crucial to the development of neural networks
in the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy. Access to fetal iodine thus partially determines cognitive
ability at birth. Using a procedure developed by Field et al. (2009, hereafter FRT), who ﬁnd
that the same intervention had large effects on schooling attainment, we assign a probability of
being treated to each child in our sample.2
We ﬁnd that children treated with iodized oil capsules while in utero are more likely to re-
ceive necessary vaccines and are breastfed for longer. Further, our data allow us to exploit
exogenous variation in the child-speciﬁc price of quality induced by the iodine intervention, en-
abling identiﬁcation of the effects of both own and siblings’ endowments on investments. In
1For example, Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004) ﬁnd a positive relationship between birth weight and adult height
and schooling attainment in the US. Black et al. (2007) verify these results using data from Norway, ﬁnding positive
effects on IQ and earnings. Almond (2006) shows that in utero exposure to the 1918 inﬂuenza pandemic in the
United States negatively affected completed educational attainment, income, socioeconomic status and adult health.
Similarly, Almond et al. (2009) ﬁnd negative effects of prenatal exposure to radioactive fallout from Chernobyl on
academic performance, but no effect on health outcomes. Field et al. (2009) ﬁnd positive effects of in utero iodine
supplementation on schooling attainment in Tanzania. Cutler et al. (2010) show that cohorts who beneﬁted in early
life from a malaria eradication campaign in India had higher economic status as adults. Baird et al. (2011) ﬁnd
that school-based de-worming can lead to gains in educational attainment, health and productivity in adulthood.
Bharadwaj et al. (2011) ﬁnd that birthweight differences in twins are correlated with test score differentials which
persist until at least the 8th grade.
2In the appendix, we replicate our main results using alternate deﬁnitions of treatment.
2line with the predictions of a simple model of intra-household resource allocations, we ﬁnd that
the effects of siblings’ endowments on own investments depends on the extent to which quality
across children is substitutable in parents’ utility function. Finally, we ﬁnd that while health
investments in infancy respond to endowment shifts, neonatal and later-childhood investments
do not. That neonatal behaviors do not change provides evidence that parental investments re-
spond directly to observed changes in the child’s cognitive ability, rather than being driven by
other aspects of the intervention program. That later childhood investments do not respond to
endowments is consistent with children acquiring agency as they grow older.
Previous studies of the link between endowments and household resource allocations have
relied on one of four endowment measures: 1) birth weight (Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009); 2)
imputed residuals from health production function estimation (e.g. Rosenzweig and Schultz
1983; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1988; Pitt et al. 1990); 3) sickness in infancy (Conti and Heckman
2011); and 4) early cognitive function as measured by a psychological test (Aizer and Cunha
2011). In general, these papers used ﬁxed effects models to examine how within-siblings or
within-twins differences in endowments generate differential parental investments.
We believe our study improves upon this previous work in four ways. First, the iodine sup-
plementation program we study induces variation in a very speciﬁc dimension of the child’s
endowment–cognitive ability–whereas all but the fourth measure above are non-speciﬁc prox-
ies which may reﬂect many dimensions of the child’s endowment. Thus, for example, while
the studies above which examine birth weight differences within twins isolate variation which
is uncorrelated with maternal or household preferences, spacing decisions, household income
paths and the like, it is unclear what the mechanism driving the investment responses of parents
is. Indeed, even amongst monozygotic twin pairs, larger twins are larger due to unequal con-
sumption in the womb, and the probable mechanisms underlying this differential consumption
are many (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004).
Second, previous studies which rely on siblings ﬁxed effects models for identiﬁcation may
be misspeciﬁed, since even within siblings, unobserved prenatal, neonatal and early-infancy
investments in each child likely correlate with whichever endowment measure is used and also
with the extent of investment during the remainder of childhood. As we argue later in the
paper, in our context exposure to the supplementation program was effectively random, and
thus cognitive gains from program exposure, which become apparent to the parent only after
birth, should be orthogonal to investments before and at the time of birth. Further, we test
directly for this orthogonality using data on neonatal behaviors, and ﬁnd evidence in support
of our claim.
Third, we expand the set of resource allocation behaviors studied in previous work to in-
clude not only neonatal and early-life investments, but also the allocation of resources in later
childhood. Using investments at different stages of childhood enables us to examine when the
3link between parental investments and endowments is most salient.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, since all the previous work in this area has restricted
attention to within-sibling or within-twin estimates, studies have been unable to separately
identify own endowment vis-` a-vis sibling endowment effects. Since our empirical strategy does
not necessitate the imposition of similar ﬁxed effect models, we are able to identify these two
endowment effects separately.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual
framework. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy. Section 5
presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we develop a simple model which relates child endowments to intra-household
allocations. The model generates predictions regarding parents’ investment responses to shifts
in their children’s endowments of quality.3 The key assumption is that an upward shift in a
child’s endowment lowers the child-speciﬁc price of quality, which in turn affects investments
in that child, as well as all other children in the household, through the optimal re-allocation
of quality. We show that the way in which children are affected by a shift in their sibling’s
endowment depends on the elasticity of substitution of child quality in the household utility
function. This parameter is also related to the extent to which parents are averse to inequality
amongst their children.
2.1 Setup
Consider a household with two children indexed i = 1;2.4 Each child is born with an exoge-
nously given endowment of quality ei. The distribution of endowments determine the within-
family distribution of prices of investment in additional quality, qi, which parents may decide
to undertake. We denote the price of quality for child i as pi  p(ei), where p is a decreasing
function of e, capturing the fact that a dollar of investment in quality will yield larger returns
for the child with a relatively higher endowment.5
Parents value the quality of their children, with preferences represented by a household
utility function u(q1;q2). We adopt a standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
3We abstract away from cognitive vs. non-cognitive measures of quality here; the model delivers qualitatively
similar predictions when there are multiple dimensions of quality.
4The model, with some additional restrictions, easily generalizes to an n-child household.
5Note that this assumption is equivalent to assuming that endowments and investments are complements in the
production function for quality. Our model would yield similar predictions even when endowments are taken as
inputs into the production of quality rather than as price shifters. The assumption of complementarity is common
in the literature on the effects of health endowments as well as cognitive endowments (see, for example, Aizer and
Cunha (2011)).
4function, which parameterizes the extent to which children’s qualities are complements or sub-
stitutes. Speciﬁcally, let parents’ utility be given by
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 2 (0;1) represents the relative utility weight given to the quality of child 1, and 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(0;+1) is the elasticity of substitution. Child quality is complementary when  < 1, and sub-
stitutable when  > 1.
The household’s utility maximization problem, given endowments (prices) and income M,
can be written as
maxq1;q2
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s.t. (2)
p1q1 + p2q2  M (3)
pi = p(ei); i = 1;2 (4)
Combining the two ﬁrst order conditions from the Lagrangian of the above maximization
problem, we obtain the following relationship between the demands for quality q1 and q2:
q1 =

p2
(1   )p1

q2: (5)
Denote   

p2
(1 )p1

. Using the budget constraint and the above equality, we obtain the
demands for quality as functions of prices, income and the model’s primitives:
q1 =
M 
 p1 + p2
(6)
q2 =
M
 p1 + p2
: (7)
2.2 Investment responses to endowment changes
We now examine the effects of a shift in the endowment of child 1 on investments in quality for
both children. These comparative statics generate predictions on the optimal intra-household
re-allocationofparentalinvestmentsinresponsetoshiftsinchild-speciﬁcendowments. Because
we have modeled endowments as factoring only into prices, equivalently we can examine the
effects of a shift in p1. Differentiating the demand functions 6 and 7 with respect to p1 and
5rearranging terms, we obtain
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The signs of the own- and cross-price elasticities thus depend in part on @ 
@p1 =   


p1

< 0.
From here, it is apparent that
@q1
@p1 < 0. The sign of
@q2
@p1 depends on  +p1
@ 
@p1. From above,
@q2
@p1 < 0
if and only if  +p1
@ 
@p1 > 0. With some algebra, this reduces to the condition that
@q2
@p1 < 0 if and
only if 0 <  < 1. Thus, the main predictions of the model, which we later test in the data, are
the following:
1. A rise in a child’s own endowment generates increases in parental investments in that
child.
2. A rise in a sibling’s endowment increases own investments if child quality is comple-
mentary in the household’s utility function, and decreases own investments if quality is
substitutable.
3 Data
In this section, we provide details on the data; variables used in analysis and their construction;
and the matching procedure used to identify residence in treatment districts.
3.1 Tanzania Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
We use the 1999, 2004 and 2007 rounds of the Tanzania DHS. As described below, many of the
early-life investment variables, such as receipt of vaccinations and duration of breast-feeding
for example, are only recorded for children under ﬁve years old. Thus, our main sample is the
sample of live children under ﬁve in 1999. There are 483 such children in 1999.
Data on bed net usage was not collected in the 1999 wave of the DHS and is therefore only
available in the 2004 and 2007 waves. In these waves, children under the age of 5 exhibit little
variation in treatment probabilities, as they were mostly born after the supplementation pro-
gram ended and its immediate effects on protection against IDD had dissipated. Accordingly,
for analysis of bed net related investments, we use the pooled sample of all children aged 5 and
above in 2004 and 2007 waves. There are 4656 such children.
Finally, we make use of a third sample of children aged 5 and above in only the 2007 wave
for analysis of later-life possessions. Information on later-life possessions is not available for the
61999 and 2004 waves. There are 2028 children aged 5 and above in our extract of the 2007 DHS.
Note that we are restricting attention to only those children living in districts that were vis-
ited at least once during the supplementation program. This is because program districts were
not chosen randomly, but rather selected on the basis of visible goiter rates. In this sense, com-
parison between districts visited at least once during the program and those excluded from
program participation is rendered invalid.
The DHS collects information on demographic characteristics of all household members.
We use the following demographic variables: child’s birth year and birth month, child’s gender
(female dummy), child’s gender-speciﬁc birth order, mother’s age, mother’s educational attain-
ment (categories of education completed; see next section for details), total number of children
in the household, number of older and younger siblings, the sum of ages of all children in the
household, the maximum and minimum age of children in the household, total household size
(including adults), and an urban dummy. Means and standard deviations of these variables are
reported in Table Ia by sample.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table Ia present means and standard deviations of child, mother,
and household level covariates included in the analysis. These statistics are reported separately
for the under 5 1999 DHS sample, 5 and over 2004 and 2007 pooled sample, and the 5 and over
2007 sample. Columns 3-6 show the same summary statistics for two subsamples of each sam-
ple: children with treatment probability of .75 and above and children with treatment probabil-
ity below .75. The treatment probability is largely determined by month and year of birth and so
we might expect to ﬁnd slight variations in the mean of age and mother’s age across these two
subsamples. This, of course, motivates the inclusion of these variables as covariates. We will, in
fact, conduct all of our analysis using ﬁxed effects for the child’s age in years to avoid any issues
deriving from this systematic relationship between timing of birth and treatment probability.
Nevertheless, we see that the differences in mean age of the child and mother across the two
subsamples are small, measuring less than a standard deviation in across all samples and in
most cases less than a year. Otherwise, the means of the remaining covariates show only mini-
mal differences across the two subsamples, with no difference having any statistical signiﬁcance
at conventional levels.
Apart from demographic information, the DHS contains detailed information on early-life
health investments for all children under ﬁve in surveyed households. We use the following
investment variables: dummies for receipt of the ﬁrst, second and third doses of polio and DPT
(diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus combination) vaccines; dummy for receipt of the measles,
BCG and polio 0 vaccines; dummy for formal-sector delivery and assisted delivery; dummy for
possession of a health card to track vaccinations; the duration of breastfeeding in months; and a
simple additive index for receipt of various ﬂuids (water, milk, juice etc.). Means and standard
deviations of these variables are reported in Table Ib.
7Finally, weexaminesomelater-childhoodinvestmentswhicharerecordedintheDHS.Specif-
ically, we look at bed net ownership and usage variables (household owns any net; household
owns a currently treated net; household owns a net that was treated at some point), and at basic
ownership of resources (does the child own a blanket, shoes, and more than one pair of clothes).
Means and standard deviations of these variables are reported in Table Ic.
3.2 IOC Supplementation Program Data
The DHS also includes, upon request, geocode data for the sampling clusters. Coordinates are
skewed using a random skewing algorithm which skews the coordinates by a distance drawn
from a uniformly distributed probability area with radius of 15km around the actual coordinate
pair. To identify which households live in intervention districts, we plotted the geocode data in
each wave onto a raster map of Tanzania with district borders. We used this mapping to identify
which clusters fell inside treatment districts (with a very small random probability of misclas-
siﬁcation due to geocode skewing by DHS). We obtained data on the names of intervention
districts and program years from FRT. We have reproduced their table of intervention districts,
years and coverage rates here as Table A.1 in the Appendix. We use these data (as described in
the next section) to construct, as FRT do, a measure of program participation.6
4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we deﬁne program participation and discuss our empirical speciﬁcation.
4.1 Deﬁnition of Program Participation
Our goal in this section is to deﬁne a treatment variable which encapsulates the extent to which
an individual was treated with IOC supplementation while in utero. We generally follow the
procedure outlined in FRT, and note where our procedure differs from theirs. To construct the
treatment indicator, we combine information on the following:
1. the month and year of birth of the child;
2. the district of the mother’s residence at time of survey;
3. years in which the program was rolled out in each district;
4. and the biological properties of iodine within the body.
6We are very grateful to Erica Field and Omar Robles for their help in this process.
8Suppose we knew exactly when each mother received IOC supplementation. If this were
true, we could calculate how long after receiving supplementation the woman was pregnant,
and thus we could determine (after making some assumptions on the rate of decay of iodine in
the body) the exact amount of exposure for the fetus.
However, we do not know the date of supplementation (nor, in fact, whether a given mother
received the IOC at all). Thus, as in FRT, we must instead calculate the probability with which an
individual was treated with IOC while in utero. FRT begins by assuming, using administrative
records from the program roll-out, that each roll-out took three months, and that the timing of
this three-month period was uniformly distributed over the roll-out year.
FRT then couples this probability with information on the birth month and birth year of the
child and the biological properties of iodine within the body to arrive at a ﬁnal probability of
treatment for each individual. IOC supplementation allows for normal development of neural
networks of fetuses in the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy, but not thereafter. Thus, the intervention
can only be effective if iodine from the IOC is present in the body during the ﬁrst trimester.
To approximate how much iodine is present at various times, FRT use information pertaining
to the decay of iodine in the body. 85 percent of the iodine is extracted immediately through
urination, and the rest is assumed to follow a hyperbolic decay pattern. Additionally, a lower
cutoff level is assumed, after which there is too little iodine left in the body for adequate pro-
tection against fetal iodine deﬁciency disorder. These values, as well as the half-life formula
deriving from the assumed hyperbolic iodine depletion, are detailed in FRT’s Web Appendix.
The procedure described above generates a probability of treatment for each month follow-
ing a roll-out for four years after a roll-out year (after which the probability is uniformly 0).
These probabilities are reported in Appendix Table 2 (replicated from FRT). Coupling data on
the birth month and birth year of each child with data on program roll-out years in each inter-
vention district, we can assign each individual in our data a probability of treatment.7 Since
program roll-outs happened up to ﬁve times in a given district, individuals may have multi-
ple instances of exposure to IOC. In these cases, we use the maximum of the multiple assigned
probabilities for that individual.
To estimate the effects of siblings’ treatment probabilities on the individual, we add up the
treatment probabilities of the two immediately older siblings and the two immediately younger
siblings in the child’s household (which may include half-siblings from a different mother) to
generate a total sibling probability of treatment. If the child has, in fact, less than two older
and/or two younger siblings, zeros are imputed for the treatment probabilities of these non-
existent siblings. In this way, we may compare children with a differing number of siblings on
7Unlike FRT, who use the Tanzania Household Budget Survey for the majority of analyses, we know the birth
year and birth month of each child, so we need not generate a year-level measure of treatment probability using the
weighting procedure (using seasonality of births) outlined in FRT. We instead use the raw treatment probabilities in
the matrix shown in Appendix Table 2.
9the basis of total treatment within the household. Treatment probabilities of siblings more than
two spaces ahead or behind the child in the birth order are ignored, with the assumption that,
for example, decisions of whether to vaccinate two children of vastly different ages are not made
contemporaneously.
For later analysis, we separate this sibling treatment into same sex and opposite sex sibling
treatments. To do so, we perform the same procedure as just discussed including the two older
and two younger siblings only if they are of the same or opposite sex as the child in question,
alternately. That is, we still exclude siblings more than two spaces ahead or behind the child in
birth order, but further exclude siblings who are of the unwanted sex in each variable, such that
the sum of opposite and same sex sibling treatments will give us the composite sibling treatment
deﬁned above.
4.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
We now turn to estimation of the effects of IOC supplementation on early-life (and some later-
childhood) health investments, using the above constructed indicator of treatment. Denote the
investment (e.g. vaccinations, length of breastfeeding, etc.) as I; own treatment probability as
To; siblings’ total treatment probability as Ts; i as child (which is the level of observation); j as
household; k as district; and X as child- and household-level controls. We estimate models of
the following speciﬁcation:
Iijk =  + To
i + Ts
j + X0
ij + k +
A X
a=0
a1(age = a) + "ijk (10)
We focus attention on two important sets of controls: district ﬁxed effects (k) and (integer)
age ﬁxed effects (a). The district ﬁxed effects capture time-invariant elements of districts which
may be correlated with demand- and supply-side factors governing adoption of health invest-
ments, as well as with treatment intensity. For example, districts with low access to vaccinations
may also have been targeted more intensively for IOC supplementation due to a higher level of
observed IDD (via visible goiter rates, as described in Section IIC, on program targeting, in FRT).
The age ﬁxed effects restrict our treatment comparisons to children of the same integer age
who have different treatment probabilities (either because they were born in different districts,
or in separate months). Since variation in T, the treatment probability, is entirely determined
by an interaction of district of birth and age in months, we must be careful to empirically dis-
tinguish between age-related trends in health investments and the true endowment effects we
seek to estimate. Integer age ﬁxed effects are thus essential, as they ﬂexibly absorb variation in
health investments related to age.
In the subsequent analysis, we also estimate the following altered speciﬁcation, in which
10sibling treatment is split into same and opposite sex sibling treatments:
Iijk =  + To
i + sTss
j + oTos
j + X0
ij + k +
A X
a=0
a1(age = a) + "ijk: (11)
This analysis will allow us to test the predictions of the model presented in section 2 above
that the cross-sibling effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between the qualities of the
different children. If we believe that sex is one characteristic which affects the degree of substi-
tutability of child qualities in the household utility function, we might expect to ﬁnd positive
effects of opposite sex sibling treatments and attenuated or even negative effects of same sex sib-
ling treatments. That is, if having a high quality son is substitutable for another high quality son,
but less substitutable for a high quality daughter, we would expect high treatment probabilities
amongst the sons to have positive effects on investments in the daughter.
4.2.1 Controls
In addition to integer age and district ﬁxed effects, we control for the demographic composition
of siblings in the individual’s household, which we must hold constant as well to make valid
inferences regarding the effects of siblings’ endowments on own health investments. Included
are the number of girl siblings, ﬁxed effects for the number of younger and of older siblings, the
sum of age across siblings, and the minimum and maximum ages of siblings.
Finally, X includes various child-level and household-level controls. Included are a fe-
male dummy, gender-speciﬁc birth order ﬁxed effects, total household size (including members
other than siblings), an urban dummy, age of the mother and ﬁxed effects for categories of the
mother’s educational attainment (none, incomplete primary, primary, incomplete secondary,
secondary, and post-secondary).
4.2.2 Sample Restrictions
Our base sample is all children in the data born between 1986 and 2002 (inclusive) in interven-
tion districts (i.e. districts which were targeted for IOC supplementation at least once). We focus
on these years of birth because this is the maximum range within which children were poten-
tially exposed to the program with positive probability. Outside of this birth year range (and
obviously outside of intervention districts), the treatment probability is uniformly zero.
The majority of our analysis is run on the sample of children under ﬁve years old (i.e. with
a maximum age of 59 months) in 1999 for whom data on vaccinations, breast-feeding etc. are
available. We do not include children under ﬁve from the later waves, since their treatment
exposure has insufﬁcient variation. For later-childhood investments (bed net usage and owner-
ship of various articles of clothing), we use the 2004 and 2007 samples of children. As relates
11to bed net ownership and usage, we use the sample of children aged 5 and above from both
the 2004 and 2007 waves (still under the restriction outlined in the last paragraph). As relates
to clothing, shoes and blankets, these variables are only deﬁned for the 2007 sample of children
between 5 and 22 (inclusive).
4.3 Potential Threats to Validity
Our goal in estimating the speciﬁcation above is to capture the causal effects of shifts in own
cognitive endowments and the cognitive endowments of siblings on own health investments.
The most salient threat to validity of the estimation strategy in this context is the endogenous
determination of fertility. If some households (or mothers) time their fertility so as to optimize
the gains from IOC supplementation, then the realized treatment probability would be larger for
these households. If these same households, who may hold a high preference for their children’s
health, make health investments more frequently, then the coefﬁcient on treatment probability
would be an upward-biased estimate of the true endowment effect.
Toinvestigatewhetherhouseholds’fertilitybehaviorsareaffectedbytreatment, wereshaped
the mother-level DHS data (appended across the 1999, 2004 and 2007 rounds) into a mother-by-
year-level data set which expands the fertility histories of each mother into a panel of 5968
women spanning 47 years (the earliest birth reported in the data was in 1961). We restrict our
analysis to the sample of years between 1986 and 2002 inclusive (the same birth year restriction
used in the data). We are left with approximately 100,000 individual-year observations. Denote
an indicator for a child birth for mother i in district j in year t as Bijt. Denote Tk
jt as a dummy
which equals one k years after a program year (t) in district j, for k 2 f0;1;2;3;4g. We run the
following speciﬁcation relating births to program years in intervention districts:
Bijt =  + Tk
jt +
I X
i=1
i1(Mother = i): (12)
The above speciﬁcation restricts attention to within-mother-level variation by employing
mother-level ﬁxed effects. We can thus determine whether program roll-out has effects on
fertility, and if so, with how much lag. The results of the estimation of this speciﬁcation for
k 2 f0;1;2;3;4g are reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The ﬁrst ﬁve columns report results
for the program roll-out indicators as described above, while the last four columns in the table
report results for speciﬁcations using cumulative indicators which span from the program year
to the kth year after. Across all of these speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd extremely small estimates tightly
bound around zero, indicating that program roll-out does not have any discernable effects on
mothers’ fertility patterns.
Finally, we check whether the treatment probability affects the quantity of children. We do
12this by regressing the number of children born to a mother after a particular child on the treat-
ment probability of that child. Again, we employ the baseline restriction by including only those
children born between 1986 and 2002 surveyed in intervention districts. This leaves a sample
of 6603 children. We run various ﬁxed effect models–speciﬁcally, district-level, household-level,
and ﬁnally mother-level. The results are reported in Table A.4. The estimated coefﬁcients, which
are small and again tightly bound around 0, conﬁrm that endogenous fertility decisions do not
appear to be signiﬁcant confounders in our context.
5 Results
5.1 Early-life Healthcare Investments
5.1.1 Vaccinations
Table II presents results from the regression of binaries for whether the child received various
vaccinations on own probability of treatment and the sum of the treatment probabilities of the
two older and two younger adjacent siblings in the birth order. As mentioned above, if the child
has less than two older and/or younger siblings, zeros are imputed for the treatments of non-
existent siblings. Siblings more than two spaces away in the birth order in either direction are
ignored, under the assumption that the investment decisions for these distant siblings are not
made concurrently with that for the child in question.
All speciﬁcations include controls for age (as ﬁxed effects) and gender of the child as well as
age and education of the mother. Controls also include a dummy for whether the household is
located in an urban area, the household size and ﬁxed effects for number of older and younger
siblings of the child as well as the sum, max and min of the ages of all children in the household.
Finally, we include the number of females in the household and ﬁxed effects for the child’s place
inagender-speciﬁcbirthorder. Thesampleisrestrictedtohouseholdswithatleast1childunder
the age of 5 from the 1999 wave of the DHS.
Columns 1-3 show positive effects on all three doses of the polio vaccine. An increase in the
probability of own treatment from 0 to 1 leads to an increase of 9 to nearly 13 percentage points
in the probability of receiving polio doses. These results are evidence of reinforcement behavior
in terms of parental investment decisions. That is, parents are more likely to vaccinate children
with higher cognitive endowments as a result of iodine supplementation.
Similarly, the effects of own treatment on all three doses of DPT shown in columns 4-6 of
Table II are positive and signiﬁcant with magnitudes of between 12.5 and 14 percentage points.
These effects on DPT vaccinations, like those on polio doses, are all signiﬁcant at the 5 or 1
percent level. In the last column of Table II, we ﬁnd a slightly smaller positive effect on receiving
the measles vaccine as well, however the estimate is insigniﬁcant at conventional levels.
13Notably, there appears to be no effects of sibling treatment on vaccinations on average. In
the second row of Table II, we ﬁnd fairly precisely estimated zeros across columns 1-7. This is an
interesting result. As mentioned above, previous studies have attempted to estimate the effects
of child endowments on parental investments using household ﬁxed effects speciﬁcations. To
the extent that a child’s endowment effects not only parental investments in that child but also
in his or her siblings, these estimates will represent the combination of these effects. In our
analysis, we are able to disentangle these effects on the high endowment child from effects on
siblings.
The estimates of the effects of sibling treatment presented in Table II suggest that, perhaps,
these effects are negligible or even zero. However, as discussed above in Section 2, we might
expect signiﬁcant heterogeneity in these effects depending on the degree of substitutability be-
tween child qualities in parental utility functions. That is, we might expect high endowments
amongst siblings of “distant” types (e.g. opposite sex) of a child to have positive effects on
parental investments in the child, given that the qualities of the two types are sufﬁciently com-
plementary in the parental utility function. On the other hand, we would expect high endow-
ments amongst same type siblings to have a much smaller or even negative effect on invest-
ments in the child, as the income and substitution effects in this instance would go in opposite
directions. We will explore gender-speciﬁc heterogeneity in effects of sibling treatment on in-
vestments below.
5.1.2 Nutrition
In Table III, we report results on the duration of breastfeeding and receipt of various ﬂuids.
Column 1 shows results from the estimation of the same speciﬁcation reported in the columns
of Table II, but with months of breastfeeding as the outcome. We see no signiﬁcant effects of
either own or sibling treatment on the number of months the child was breastfed. The point
estimates are quite small relative to the mean.
However, we ﬁnd in column 2 of Table III positive and signiﬁcant effects of own treatment
on the probability of being breastfed for at least 6 months. WHO guidelines suggest that at least
6 months of breastfeeding greatly improves the health of the child and reduces the probability
of sickness. An increase in own treatment probability from 0 to 1 induces a 10.6 percentage
point increase in the probability of meeting these guidelines. The estimate is signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level.
Column 3 of Table III shows the regression of own treatment and sibling treatment on an
index for whether the child was given a variety of ﬂuids. The index includes water, milk, juice,
etc. and represents a variety of nutrients the child needs. We ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant effects
of own treatment on the receipt of ﬂuids. A treated child receives an entire category of ﬂuids
more than an untreated child, and the estimate is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
14Again, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects of sibling treatment. The point estimates in the second
row of Table III are quite small relative to the means of the dependant variables. We interpret
these coefﬁcients as precisely estimated zeros.
5.1.3 Neonatal
We turn our attention next to neonatal investments. We suspect that parental investments are
responding to observed higher cognitive endowments in the treated children. However, it is
possible that parents are, at least in part, responding to an expectation of higher endowments
treated children. That is, it is possible that parents believe even before the child shows signs of
higher cognitive ability, indeed perhaps even before the child is born, that he will be of higher
quality due to information received during or after the visit of the supplementation program to
their district.
So long as fertility decisions are not made on the basis of this altered expectation, the empiri-
cal strategy employed here is valid. We verify that the program does not affect fertility decisions
in the Appendix. Nevertheless, it is of some interest to explore how early parental investment
responses appear, as the implied mechanism will be affected. In particular, the external va-
lidity of our estimates is considerably strengthened if we have reason to believe that parental
investments in fact respond to observed variation in endowments rather than to the information
dispensed by this particular supplementation program.
In Table IV, we present results from regressions of neonatal investments on individual and
sibling treatments. Columns 1 and 2 of Table IV, show effects of increased probability of treat-
ment on binaries for a formal-sector and medically assisted delivery, respectively. We ﬁnd zeros
for these effects, with point estimates less than a percentage point in magnitude. Again, we ﬁnd
no effects of sibling treatment as well.
Column 3 reports estimates of the effects of own and sibling treatment on the initial dose of
the polio vaccine which is customarily given at birth. Column 4 corresponds to a regression of
receipt of the BCG vaccine on own and sibling treatment. The BCG vaccine is also customarily
given between 0 and 6 weeks of age. In both columns, we ﬁnd insigniﬁcant effects of own treat-
ment and sibling treatment. In column 5, estimates from a regression of a binary for whether
the child has a health card on own and sibling treatment are reported. A health card is used to
keep track of which vaccinations the child has received and is usually issued very early in the
child’s life. Here again the point estimates are small and insigniﬁcant.
In summary, we ﬁnd no effects of improved cognitive endowments on neonatal investments.
This could suggest either that very little information about the beneﬁts of iodine supplementa-
tion for initial child quality was communicated to parents, or that this information was com-
municated but did not sufﬁciently change beliefs about initial quality. In particular, while it is
possible that delivery-related investments simply do not manifest parental preferences for in-
15vestment in a child, the fact that neonatal vaccinations do not respond when vaccinations later
in infancy do is stronger evidence that perhaps parental expectations of quality and subsequent
investments in children respond to observed variations in endowments.
5.1.4 Later-life Investments
Now that we have some idea of when early-life health investments begin to respond to im-
proved initial endowments, we explore the persistence of this reinforcing investment behavior
into later-life. In Table V, we report results of regressions on a sample of children aged 5 and
above from the 2004 and 2007 waves of the Tanzania DHS.
Columns 1-3 present estimates from regressions of bed net use on own and sibling treatment.
We ﬁnd no effects on the use of any net, the use of a treated net, and the use of a net which had
ever been treated. Point estimates are very small with tight standard error bands around them.
The estimates are insigniﬁcant at conventional levels, with the only exception being a small but
weakly signiﬁcant positive effect of sibling treatment on the use of an ever-treated net of roughly
1.5 percentage points.
In columns 4-6 of Table V, estimates are presented from regressions of binaries measuring the
child’s possession of a blanket, shoes, and more than one pair of clothes, respectively. Again,
we ﬁnd that both own treatment and sibling treatment have no signiﬁcant effects on the child’s
possession of these assets. The use of bed nets and the possession of basic necessities such
as clothes, shoes, and a blanket are both reasonably health-enhancing and represent parental
investments into the welfare of a child.
Therefore, it would appear that, at least in terms of bed net use and basic needs, the effects of
improved initial endowments on parental investments do not persist into later childhood. This
could be due to the child’s strengthening bargaining power as he grows older. That is, when the
child is young the resource allocation and investment decisions are made entirely by the parent
based on the parents’ expectations of quality and returns to investment and preferences over the
quality distribution across the children in the household. However, as the child grows older, he
can vie for his own resources and bargain within the household, diminishing the effect of initial
endowments on investments in later childhood.
5.2 Intra-householdInvestmentAllocationandParentalPreferencesforChildQual-
ity
In Tables II-V, we saw that estimates of the average effects of treatment probabilities of adja-
cent siblings in the birth order on parental investments in a child, holding his own treatment
probability ﬁxed, are generally insigniﬁcant. However, the results from the model presented in
Section 2 suggest that cross-sibling effects on parental investments likely vary with respect to
16the degree of complementarity of child qualities in the household utility function. That is, for
example, if we believe that male and female child qualities are complements in the household
utility function, while the qualities of same sex siblings are substitutes, the model predicts that
opposite sex sibling treatments will have positive effects on investments, while same sex sibling
treatments will have less positive or even negative effects on investments–as the income and
substitution effects will be of opposite sign.
In Tables VI-IX, we present results from regressions identical to those whose results are re-
ported in Tables II-V, but with sibling treatment split into same and opposite sex treatments.
Speciﬁcally, same sex sibling treatment is the sum of the treatment probabilities over same sex
siblings in the set of the child’s two immediately older and two immediately younger siblings.
Opposite sex sibling treatment is the corresponding sum over opposite sex siblings.
The third row of Table VI shows signiﬁcant and positive effects of opposite sex sibling treat-
menton thereceipt ofall threepoliodoses, thethird DPTdose, andthe measlesvaccine. Though
the estimates of the effects on the ﬁrst two DPT doses are insigniﬁcant at conventional levels,
the point estimates are of similar order of magnitude. As predicted by the model, estimates of
the effects of same sex sibling treatment are smaller, insigniﬁcant and even negative in some
instances. These results suggest that male and female child qualities are in fact complements in
the household utility function, while the qualities of same sex siblings are more substitutable.
In Table VII, we do not ﬁnd generally strong cross-sibling effects on nutritional investments.
We see a positive, but only weakly signiﬁcant effect of opposite sex sibling treatment on meeting
the WHO guideline for sufﬁcient duration of breastfeeding in column 2 of Table VII. The muted
effects on breastfeeding are not surprising given the time-dependent nature this investment.
In particular, the scope for an effect of treatment among younger siblings on breast-feeding is
obviously severely limited. Additionally, it would seem that the routine allocation of standard
nutritional resources, such as milk and juices, is perhaps by nature less exclusionary than more
singular investments such as vaccinations or medical treatments.
While we expect to ﬁnd no effect of own treatments on neonatal investments if observed
variation in cognitive ability is the predominant mechanism through which cognitive endow-
ments affect parental investments, we have no such expectation of cross-sibling effects. In fact,
we would expect that opposite sex sibling treatments might affect investments irrespective of
own endowment and therefore induce parental responses well before endowments are observ-
able or even realized. We ﬁnd in Table VIII evidence of positive effects on the receipt of the BCG
vaccination and possession of a health card. Both are investments that most often occur well
before endowments are observable.
Finally, in Table IX we explore persistence of cross-sibling effects. Estimates are only weakly
signiﬁcant at best, and exhibit no systematic pattern in sign. We interpret these estimates as
evidence of a lack of measurable persistence of cross-sibling effects into later-life investments.
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Using exogenous variation in initial cognitive endowments of children derived from an iodine
supplementation program in Tanzania, we provide evidence of reinforcing investment behavior.
Treated children are signiﬁcantlymore likely to receive vaccinations and nutritional investments
in the form of adequate breastfeeding and a variety of essential ﬂuids. However, we ﬁnd no
evidence that this endowment reinforcing health investment begins directly at birth, nor does it
seem to persist into later childhood.
The absence of neonatal investment responses is likely due to the inability to perceive im-
proved cognitive endowments before and immediately after birth. In infancy, children quickly
show signs of cognitive ability, from which parents assess beliefs about initial endowments and
adjust investment decisions accordingly. The lack of persistence in reinforcing investments is
possibly due to the growing child’s mitigating bargaining behavior. As the child grows older,
he is able to bargain for his own resources, and investments no longer reﬂect solely the expecta-
tions and preferences of the parent.
Though we initially ﬁnd no cross-sibling effects on average within the household, when we
separate sibling treatment into opposite and same sex sibling treatments we ﬁnd positive and
signiﬁcant estimates of the effect of the treatment of opposite sex siblings on at-birth and early-
life vaccinations. However, we ﬁnd smaller, insigniﬁcant and even negative estimates in some
instances of the effects of same sex sibling treatments on these health investments. These results
suggest, in the context of the predictions of the model presented in Section 2, that the qualities
of two opposite sex siblings are complementary in the household utility function, while the
qualities of two same sex siblings are more substitutable.
One can conceive of several mechanisms by which greater investment in one child might
spill-over or crowd-out investment in other children in the household. There are ﬁrst order
income and substitution effects from the reduced “price” of quality of the treated child. In par-
ticular, if endowments and parental investments are complements in the production of child
quality, as is often assumed, the parent can achieve a high level of quality in the higher endow-
ment child more “cheaply” than in their lower endowment children. On the other hand, the
exogenous shift in the quality of one child induces an income effect as well which should allow
greater investment in all children than would otherwise be possible.
Additionally, to the extent that investments are not particularly time sensitive, scale effects
could exist in investments. The prevailing example of such an effect is that of time spent with
a child, perhaps reading or helping with school work. That is, if a parent is motivated to spend
time with one child because it is of higher initial cognitive endowment, the parent might not
wantorneedtoexcludeotherchildren. Thiscouldpotentiallybetrueinourcaseofvaccinations.
If the parent is willing to forego time spent in a production activity to take a high endowment
18child to the healthcare facility to be vaccinated, they might as well take the other, possibly lower
endowment, child as well.
One ﬁnal way in which investments in one child might affect investments in his siblings
is through learning. That is, perhaps parents are moved to invest more in children with higher
initialendowmentsduetoahigherexpectedreturnoninvestment, butlaterupdatebeliefsabout
returns to investments based on this experience. Then, investment in subsequent children (or
existing siblings, depending on the time-sensitivity of the investment) will be affected by the
endowment of this child through this learning mechanism.
However, when investments are time-sensitive (e.g. must be made before or after the child
reaches a particular age) or are by nature exclusionary by age (e.g. a mother must stop breast-
feeding one child in order to conceive the next, and will not likely breastfeed the ﬁrst child again
after 9 months), exploring the degree to which the qualities of children become more comple-
mentary in the household utility function as the children move further apart in the birth order
is rendered difﬁcult. In fact, both scale and learning effects are difﬁcult to identify in these
instances. For this reason, we have only investigated complementarity across gender in this
study. Further research is needed to understand child quality complementarity across age or
birth order for a more relevant set of investment behaviors.
In our context, if either learning or scale were important mechanisms by which sibling treat-
ments affect vaccinations, nutritional investments, and possession of later-life assets in our con-
text, we might expect to see signiﬁcant effects of same sex sibling treatment. That is, to the degree
that returns to investments are gender-speciﬁc, parents will likely be most able to update expec-
tations about returns using observed returns to siblings of the same sex. Similarly, to the degree
that investments themselves are gender-speciﬁc (e.g. clothes, shoes, and even, to some degree,
bed nets if same sex siblings are more likely to sleep in the same bed than are opposite sex
siblings), we would expect to see the largest spill-overs onto siblings of the same sex.
The fact that we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects of same sex sibling treatment on any of the in-
vestment outcomes employed in this paper, perhaps, suggests that these mechanisms are unim-
portant in this context. However, this is by no means a central conclusion of this paper and the
absence of these results must be interpreted with caution. In particular, though a child may not,
in general, be too old to receive a vaccination, he might be too young, or perhaps not yet born.
In this sense, scale effects in the context of vaccinations cannot occur and income and substitu-
tion effects will likely grow weaker with greater spacing between births, particularly given the
relatively low cost of the investment. The effects of learning should not decay quite as quickly,
but of course only apply to younger siblings, as mentioned above. For these reasons, further
research is needed to better understand cross-sibling effects by relative age and/or place in the
birth order.
This study focuses its analysis on the relationship between variations in cognitive endow-
19ments and health investments. As mentioned, it is likely that spillovers to other children in the
household also exist in other types of investment such as time spent with the child or education-
related investments. Though previous studies have addressed these topics to some degree, our
results emphasize the importance of separating the effects of endowments on own investments
from effects on investments in siblings.
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22A Additional Results
B Construction of variables
The following variables were constructed for use in the analysis:
 treatprob
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28Child-Year Observations:
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Child-level
     Age 1.847 1.404 2.105 1.269 1.717 1.453
     Female 0.474 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.461 0.499
     Birth Order 3.164 2.109 2.938 1.765 3.277 2.257
Mother-level
     Mother's Age 28.464 6.935 28.747 6.522 28.321 7.140
     Mother's Educational Attainment 5.048 3.176 4.988 3.240 5.078 3.148
Household-level
     No. of Children 3.602 2.293 3.414 2.011 3.698 2.420
     Household Size 6.720 3.321 6.315 2.905 6.925 3.499
     Urban 0.087 0.282 0.099 0.299 0.081 0.273
Child-Year Observations:
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Child-level
     Age 10.405 4.008 11.147 3.020 10.064 4.347
     Female 0.493 0.500 0.515 0.500 0.483 0.500
     Birth Order 2.387 1.489 2.296 1.406 2.429 1.523
Mother-level
     Mother's Age 36.389 6.669 37.273 6.222 35.982 6.827
     Mother's Educational Attainment 4.722 3.269 4.753 3.193 4.708 3.304
Household-level
     No. of Children 4.747 2.223 4.868 2.403 4.691 2.133
     Household Size 7.324 3.122 7.387 3.454 7.294 2.957
     Urban 0.101 0.301 0.116 0.320 0.093 0.291
Child-Year Observations:
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Child-level
     Age 9.912 3.552 12.403 2.419 9.066 3.478
     Female 0.504 0.500 0.521 0.500 0.499 0.500
     Birth Order 2.389 1.402 2.093 1.188 2.489 1.454
Mother-level
     Mother's Age 35.814 6.580 37.827 5.753 35.130 6.703
     Mother's Educational Attainment 4.955 3.210 4.844 3.129 4.993 3.237
Household-level
     No. of Children 4.633 1.964 4.905 1.942 4.540 1.963
     Household Size 7.221 2.539 7.424 2.444 7.152 2.568
     Urban 0.089 0.284 0.095 0.294 0.087 0.281
Notes: 
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Table Ia: Summary Statistics (Demographic Characteristics)
Summary Statistics of Demographic Characteristics By Sample
Treatment Prob <.75 Treatment Prob >=.75
162
2028 514 1514
Children Aged Under 5 in 1999 DHS
Children Aged 5 and Above in 2004 & 2007 DHS
Children Aged 5 and Above in 2007 DHS
Whole Sample Treatment Prob >=.75
Whole Sample
Treatment Prob <.75
Whole Sample Treatment Prob >=.75 Treatment Prob <.75
4656 1467 3189
483Child-Year Observations:
Mean SD
Program Exposure
     Treatment Probability 0.430 0.425
     Treatment Probability >0 0.679 0.467
Vaccinations
     Polio 1 Dose 0.934 0.249
     Polio 2 Dose 0.899 0.302
     Polio 3 Dose 0.820 0.385
     DPT 1 Dose 0.917 0.276
     DPT 2 Dose 0.888 0.315
     DPT 3 Dose 0.828 0.378
     Measles 0.753 0.432
Nutritional Investments
     Mos. Breastfeeding 16.176 8.305
     Mos. Breastfeeding >6 0.871 0.336
     Given Fluids Index (Water, Milk, Juice, etc.) 2.224 2.754
Neonatal Investments
     Formal Sector Delivery 0.445 0.497
     Assisted Delivery 0.938 0.242
     Has Healthcard 0.441 0.497
     Polio 0 Dose 0.940 0.238
     BCG 0.959 0.199
Notes: 
Children Aged Under 5 in 1999 DHS
Table Ib: Summary Statistics (Outcomes)
Summary Statistics of Outcomes By Sample
483Child-Year Observations:
Mean SD Mean SD
Program Exposure
     Treatment Probability 0.328 0.416 0.325 0.410
     Treatment Probability >0 0.494 0.500 0.509 0.500
Later-Life Investments
     Any Net 0.150 0.357
     Treated Net 0.077 0.266
     Ever-Treated Net 0.109 0.312
     Blanket 0.360 0.480
     Shoes 0.523 0.500
     Clothes 0.768 0.422
Notes:  
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Table Ic: Summary Statistics (Outcomes)
Summary Statistics of Outcomes By Sample
Children Aged 5 and Above 
in 2007 DHS
Children Aged 5 and Above in 
2004 & 2007 DHS
5564Measles
1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose 1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose
Treatment Probability 0.0911** 0.126*** 0.122** 0.127*** 0.139*** 0.125** 0.0899
(0.0402) (0.0430) (0.0516) (0.0423) (0.0439) (0.0496) (0.0553)
Sibling Treatment 0.0293 0.0206 0.0410 0.0505 0.0286 0.0326 -0.0188
(0.0311) (0.0342) (0.0393) (0.0319) (0.0340) (0.0394) (0.0376)
Female 0.0313 0.0547* 0.0286 0.0412 0.0487* 0.0510 0.0674**
(0.0242) (0.0280) (0.0387) (0.0252) (0.0292) (0.0352) (0.0316)
Age=2 0.122** 0.246*** 0.368*** 0.161*** 0.247*** 0.388*** 0.723***
(0.0505) (0.0572) (0.0669) (0.0554) (0.0590) (0.0674) (0.0611)
Age=3 0.174*** 0.248*** 0.445*** 0.211*** 0.249*** 0.448*** 0.874***
(0.0594) (0.0656) (0.0764) (0.0612) (0.0668) (0.0879) (0.0655)
Age=4 0.157** 0.243*** 0.430*** 0.210*** 0.277*** 0.446*** 0.937***
(0.0700) (0.0787) (0.0918) (0.0711) (0.0800) (0.0976) (0.0900)
Age=5 0.171** 0.237*** 0.409*** 0.200*** 0.255*** 0.486*** 0.966***
(0.0732) (0.0822) (0.0988) (0.0766) (0.0845) (0.115) (0.0971)
Fixed Effects District
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 481
Mean of Dependent 
Variable
0.934 0.899 0.820 0.917 0.888 0.828 0.753
Table II: Healthcare Investments (Vaccinations)
Effects of IOC Treatment on Vaccinations
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Stamdard errors are clustered at the district-age level. Sibling Treatment is the 
sum of treatment probabilities of the two older and two younger siblings. All specifications include controls for age (as fixed effects) and gender of the 
child as well as age and education of the mother.  Controls also include a dummy for whether the household is located in an urban area, the household size 
and fixed effects for number of older and younger siblings of the child as well as the sum, max and min of the ages of all children in the household. Finally, 
we include the number of females in the household and fixed effects for the child's place in a gender-specific birth order. The sample is restricted to 
households with at least 1 child under the age of 5 from the 1999 DHS, unless otherwise noted.
Polio DPT
District DistrictGiven Fluids
Months 1[> 6 Months] Index
Treatment Probability 0.857 0.106** 1.195**
(0.895) (0.0421) (0.485)
Sibling Treatment 0.468 0.0336 0.195
(0.725) (0.0264) (0.336)
Female -0.450 0.0170 -0.108
(0.720) (0.0245) (0.176)
Age=2 11.09*** 0.554*** 0.511
(0.862) (0.0594) (0.316)
Age=3 14.60*** 0.538*** 0.435
(1.388) (0.0669) (0.413)
Age=4 16.00*** 0.514*** 1.757**
(2.011) (0.0792) (0.873)
Age=5 16.16*** 0.533*** 0.714
(2.287) (0.0830) (0.513)
Fixed Effects District
Observations 478 479 474
Mean of Dependent Variable 16.18 0.871 2.224
Table III: Healthcare Investments (Nutrition)
Effects of IOC Treatment on Nutritional Investments
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional 
comments.
Breastfeeding
DistrictFormal Sector Assisted Polio 0 Dose BCG Health Card
Treatment Probability -0.000448 0.00519 -0.0134 0.0201 0.0164
(0.0601) (0.0422) (0.0739) (0.0307) (0.0226)
Sibling Treatment -0.0279 -0.0388 -0.0488 0.00226 0.0139
(0.0456) (0.0331) (0.0581) (0.0275) (0.0253)
Female -0.0420 -0.0551** -0.0186 0.0175 -0.00629
(0.0450) (0.0272) (0.0543) (0.0240) (0.0186)
Age=2 0.0924 0.0573 0.0330 0.0965** 0.0866**
(0.0677) (0.0404) (0.0774) (0.0435) (0.0374)
Age=3 0.107 -0.0201 -0.0209 0.0965* 0.0994**
(0.0958) (0.0577) (0.107) (0.0538) (0.0421)
Age=4 0.158 -0.0521 0.0390 0.0927 0.105**
(0.112) (0.0791) (0.139) (0.0645) (0.0480)
Age=5 0.288** -0.00977 0.0327 0.0731 0.0990*
(0.130) (0.0842) (0.158) (0.0684) (0.0556)
Fixed Effects
Observations 483 483 483 483 483
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.445 0.938 0.441 0.940 0.959
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.
Vaccinations Delivery
District
Table IV: Healthcare Investments (Neonatal)
Effects of IOC Treatment on Neonatal Investments
DistrictAny Net Treated Net
Ever-Treated 
Net
Blanket Shoes Clothes
Treatment Probability 0.00421 -0.00544 0.00651 0.0101 -0.00162 0.0112
(0.0145) (0.0109) (0.0128) (0.0342) (0.0349) (0.0322)
Sibling Treatment 0.0134 -0.00328 0.0148* -0.0117 0.00233 0.00922
(0.00960) (0.00682) (0.00818) (0.0229) (0.0248) (0.0212)
Female 0.00676 0.0200** 0.0202** 0.0105 -0.00143 0.0177
(0.0113) (0.00839) (0.00981) (0.0221) (0.0242) (0.0206)
Fixed Effects
Observations 4656 4656 4656 2028 2027 2029
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.142 0.0747 0.108 0.360 0.523 0.768
Table V: Later-Life Investments
Effects of IOC Treatment on Use of Bed Nets and Possessions
Possessions
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. Samples restricted as noted.
District, Age
Bed Nets
District, Age
aged 5 and over from 2004 & 2007 DHS aged 5 and over from 2007 DHSMeasles
1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose 1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose
Treatment Probability 0.0997*** 0.133*** 0.123** 0.131*** 0.144*** 0.129*** 0.106*
(0.0385) (0.0418) (0.0511) (0.0412) (0.0431) (0.0487) (0.0556)
Same Sex Sibling Treatment 0.0195 0.0343 0.0237 0.0503 0.0366 -0.00389 -0.0153
(0.0386) (0.0448) (0.0563) (0.0449) (0.0452) (0.0575) (0.0549)
Opposite Sex Sibling Treatment 0.0949*** 0.0627* 0.0876* 0.0596 0.0632 0.0906** 0.0910**
(0.0315) (0.0378) (0.0469) (0.0383) (0.0393) (0.0451) (0.0433)
Female 0.0311 0.0518* 0.0243 0.0417 0.0455 0.0475 0.0655**
(0.0244) (0.0277) (0.0388) (0.0255) (0.0289) (0.0352) (0.0315)
Fixed Effects District, Age
Observations 475 475 475 475 475 475 473
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.934 0.899 0.820 0.917 0.888 0.828 0.753
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.
Effects of IOC Treatment on Vaccinations
Table VI: Healthcare Investments (Vaccinations)
District, Age District, Age
Polio DPTGiven Fluids
Months 1[> 6 Months] Index
Treatment Probability 0.741 0.0999** 1.194**
(0.906) (0.0422) (0.503)
Same Sex Sibling Treatment -0.573 0.00981 0.469
(1.209) (0.0338) (0.318)
Opposite Sex Sibling Treatment 0.574 0.0542* -0.277
(0.788) (0.0287) (0.313)
Female -0.468 0.0155 -0.125
(0.729) (0.0245) (0.178)
Fixed Effects District, Age
Observations 470 471 466
Mean of Dependent Variable 16.18 0.871 2.224
Table VII: Healthcare Investments (Nutrition)
Effects of IOC Treatment on Nutritional Investments
Breastfeeding
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.
District, AgeFormal Sector Assisted Polio 0 Dose BCG Health Card
Treatment Probability 0.00525 0.0135 -0.0210 0.0306 0.0259
(0.0619) (0.0412) (0.0741) (0.0289) (0.0217)
Same Sex Sibling Treatment 0.00465 -0.0123 0.00554 0.0222 0.0245
(0.0635) (0.0507) (0.0687) (0.0388) (0.0394)
Opposite Sex Sibling Treatment 0.0253 -0.0406 -0.0297 0.0641** 0.0636**
(0.0533) (0.0429) (0.0624) (0.0323) (0.0301)
Female -0.0380 -0.0569** -0.0209 0.0133 -0.00658
(0.0454) (0.0271) (0.0539) (0.0237) (0.0186)
Fixed Effects
Observations 475 475 475 475 475
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.445 0.938 0.441 0.940 0.959
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.
District, Age
Delivery
Table VIII: Healthcare Investments (Neonatal)
Effects of IOC Treatment on Neonatal Investments
Vaccinations
District, AgeAny Net Treated Net
Ever-Treated 
Net
Blanket Shoes Clothes
Treatment Probability 0.00152 -0.00560 0.00418 0.00635 -0.0000173 0.0165
(0.0145) (0.0109) (0.0128) (0.0338) (0.0345) (0.0319)
Same Sex Sibling Treatment -0.00924 -0.00928 0.00323 -0.00694 0.0549* 0.0365
(0.0116) (0.00818) (0.0101) (0.0296) (0.0306) (0.0266)
Opposite Sex Sibling Treatment 0.00434 -0.00396 0.00454 -0.0517* -0.00790 0.0447*
(0.0111) (0.00804) (0.00960) (0.0284) (0.0307) (0.0269)
Female 0.00681 0.0200** 0.0202** 0.00841 -0.00138 0.0198
(0.0113) (0.00841) (0.00983) (0.0221) (0.0242) (0.0207)
Fixed Effects
Observations 4652 4652 4652 2028 2027 2029
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.142 0.0747 0.108 0.360 0.523 0.768
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.
Bed Nets
District, Age
Table IX: Later-Life Investments
Effects of IOC Treatment on Use of Bed Nets and Possessions
Possessions
aged 5 and over from 2004 & 2007 DHS aged 5 and over from 2007 DHS
District, AgeRegion District Year 1 Coverage 1 Year 2 Coverage 2 Year 3 Coverage 3 Year 4 Coverage 4 Year 5 Coverage 5
Dodoma Mpwapwa 1990 0.65 1992 0.58  
Arusha Monduli 1992 0.71
Arusha Arumeru 1991 0.89
Kilimanjaro Rombo 1990 0.68
Morogoro Ulanga 1988 0.73 1991 0.61 1992 0.34
Ruvuma Songea Rural 1987 0.91 1991 0.74 1995 0.85
Ruvuma Mbinga 1995 0.92
Iringa Mufindi 1986 0.41 1991 0.63 1995 0.54
Iringa Makete 1986 0.2 1991 0.62 1993 0.62 1996 0.49
Iringa Njombe 1989 0.76 1992 0.68 1995 0.64
Iringa Ludewa 1989 0.59 1992 0.62 1995 0.47
Mbeya Chunya 1990 0.49
Mbeya Mbeya Rural 1986 0.44 1989 0.84 1990 0.9 1993 0.53 1997 0.53
Mbeya Kyela 1989 0.91 1993 0.57
Mbeya Rungwe 1986 0.35 1990 0.73 1993 0.49
Mbeya Ileje 1989 0.94 1992 0.71
Mbeya Mbozi 1989 0.67 1991 0.63
Rukwa Mpanda 1987 0.79 1991 0.6 1993 0.72
Rukwa Sumbawanga 1987 0.76 1990 0.89 1993 0.72 1996 0.51
Rukwa Nkansi 1987 0.89 1991 0.49
Kigoma Kibondo 1989 0.73 1992 0.75 1996
Kigoma Kasulu 1987 0.5 1990 0.66 1996 0.49
Kigoma Kigoma Rural 1991 0.91
Kagera Karagwe 1990 0.96 1994 0.85
Kagera Bukoba Rural 1994 0.78
Kagera Biharamulo 1990 0.96 1994 0.38
Kagera Ngara 1989 0.29 1994 0.51
Table A.1: Program Years
Notes: Taken from Field et al. (2009)Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Program Year 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.083 0.167 0.250 0.333
1st Year After Program 0.417 0.500 0.583 0.667 0.750 0.833 0.917 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2nd Year After Program 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.991 0.977
3rd Year After Program 0.955 0.927 0.891 0.849 0.802 0.749 0.690 0.627 0.559 0.488 0.419 0.353
4th Year After Program 0.292 0.237 0.189 0.148 0.112 0.082 0.057 0.037 0.022 0.011 0.004 0.001
Table A.2: Treatment Probabilities
Notes: Taken from Field et al. (2009)Program 
Year
1st Year After 
Program
2nd Year After 
Program
3rd Year After 
Program
4th Year After 
Program
Program Yr -> 1 
Yr After
Program Yr -> 
2 Yrs After
Program Yr -> 
3 Yrs After
Program Yr -> 4 
Yrs After
Birth in This Yr -0.000950 -0.00142 -0.00112 0.00257 -0.00316 -0.00205 -0.00350 -0.00315 -0.00387
(0.00300) (0.00285) (0.00296) (0.00299) (0.00370) (0.00257) (0.00263) (0.00284) (0.00321)
Fixed Effects
Observations 101456 101456 101456 101456 101456 101456 101456 101456 101456
Mean of Dependent 
Variable
0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930 0.0930
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Mother Mother
Table A.3: Robustness Checks (Endogenous Fertility: Timing)
Effects of Treatment on Probability of Birth
Program and Subsequent Years Program and Subsequen Years (Cumulative)Treatment Probability 0.0212 0.0110 0.00757
(0.0133) (0.00895) (0.00684)
Fixed Effects Disctrict Household Mother
Observations 6603 6603 6603
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.759 1.759 1.759
Table A.4: Robustness Checks (Endogenous Fertility: Quantity)
Effects of Treatment on No. of Births After Treatment
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.
No. of Children Born After Treated ChildMeasles
1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose 1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose
Treatment Probability 0.0479 0.0551 0.0800* 0.0742** 0.0766** 0.0717* 0.0420
(0.0340) (0.0359) (0.0425) (0.0346) (0.0353) (0.0409) (0.0391)
Sibling Treatment -0.0119 -0.0354 -0.0146 -0.00774 -0.0313 -0.0230 -0.0319
(0.0205) (0.0220) (0.0247) (0.0199) (0.0216) (0.0247) (0.0219)
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 481
Given 
Fluids
Months
1[> 6 
Months]
Index
Formal 
Sector
Assisted
Polio 0 
Dose
BCG
Health 
Card
Treatment Probability 0.145 0.0371 0.898* -0.0126 0.0196 0.00305 -0.00579 0.00206
(0.800) (0.0334) (0.494) (0.0487) (0.0317) (0.0625) (0.0259) (0.0170)
Sibling Treatment 0.393 -0.0125 0.0246 -0.00963 0.00328 -0.0367 -0.0345* -0.0146
(0.421) (0.0160) (0.230) (0.0282) (0.0169) (0.0341) (0.0185) (0.0150)
Observations 478 479 474 483 483 483 483 483
Any Net Treated Net
Ever-
Treated 
Net
Blanket Shoes Clothes
Treatment Probability 0.000732 -0.00796 -0.00178 0.0224 0.000137 0.0121
(0.0119) (0.00909) (0.0105) (0.0281) (0.0285) (0.0267)
Sibling Treatment 0.000756 -0.00987** -0.00237 -0.00149 -0.0132 0.0164
(0.00650) (0.00468) (0.00567) (0.0165) (0.0184) (0.0157)
Observations 4656 4656 4656 2028 2027 2029
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. Treatment is a binary for full protection against IDD, with 
probability of at least  5  
Table A.5: Robustness to Alternate Treatment Definitions (Half)
Effects of IOC Treatment on Vaccinations
Polio DPT
Effects of IOC Treatment on Nutritional Investments and Neonatal Investments
Breastfeeding Delivery Vaccinations
Effects of IOC Treatment on Use of Bed Nets and Possessions
Bed Nets Possessions
aged 5 and over from 2004 & 2007 DHS aged 5 and over from 2007 DHSMeasles
1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose 1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose
Treatment Probability 0.0421 0.0727** 0.0823** 0.0624** 0.0794** 0.0903** 0.0551
(0.0286) (0.0315) (0.0394) (0.0296) (0.0319) (0.0358) (0.0422)
Sibling Treatment 0.00624 0.00193 0.0150 0.0205 0.00869 0.0207 -0.0298
(0.0200) (0.0238) (0.0301) (0.0225) (0.0253) (0.0289) (0.0257)
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 481
Given 
Fluids
Months
1[> 6 
Months]
Index
Formal 
Sector
Assisted
Polio 0 
Dose
BCG
Health 
Card
Treatment Probability 0.767 0.0931*** 1.074** -0.0142 -0.0141 0.0262 0.00556 0.00777
(0.734) (0.0294) (0.428) (0.0467) (0.0310) (0.0557) (0.0230) (0.0182)
Sibling Treatment 0.0943 0.0189 0.145 -0.0494 -0.0456** -0.0228 0.00274 0.0229
(0.496) (0.0195) (0.190) (0.0315) (0.0222) (0.0380) (0.0192) (0.0158)
Observations 478 479 474 483 483 483 483 483
Any Net Treated Net
Ever-
Treated 
Net
Blanket Shoes Clothes
Treatment Probability 0.00821 -0.00290 0.00838 0.0106 -0.00796 -0.00563
(0.0120) (0.00910) (0.0106) (0.0284) (0.0289) (0.0253)
Sibling Treatment 0.00834 -0.00656 0.00784 -0.00493 0.00606 0.00116
(0.00704) (0.00499) (0.00622) (0.0172) (0.0185) (0.0165)
Observations 4656 4656 4656 2028 2027 2029
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. Treatment is a binary for full protection against IDD, with 
probability of at least  75  
Table A.6: Robustness to Alternate Treatment Definitions (3/4)
Effects of IOC Treatment on Vaccinations
Polio DPT
Effects of IOC Treatment on Nutritional Investments and Neonatal Investments
Breastfeeding Delivery Vaccinations
Effects of IOC Treatment on Use of Bed Nets and Possessions
Bed Nets Possessions
aged 5 and over from 2004 & 2007 DHS aged 5 and over from 2007 DHSMeasles
1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose 1st Dose 2nd Dose 3rd Dose
Treatment Probability 0.0358 0.0319 0.0404 0.0349 0.0317 0.0427 0.0386
(0.0256) (0.0287) (0.0432) (0.0270) (0.0315) (0.0372) (0.0473)
Sibling Treatment 0.0191 -0.00213 -0.00253 0.0214 -0.00415 0.00905 -0.00933
(0.0192) (0.0241) (0.0320) (0.0224) (0.0252) (0.0270) (0.0275)
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 481
Given 
Fluids
Months
1[> 6 
Months]
Index
Formal 
Sector
Assisted
Polio 0 
Dose
BCG
Health 
Card
Treatment Probability 0.0318 0.0227 0.917 0.00891 -0.0558 0.0662 -0.0144 -0.0170
(0.822) (0.0211) (0.574) (0.0557) (0.0344) (0.0610) (0.0277) (0.0199)
Sibling Treatment -0.383 -0.000666 0.360* -0.0480 -0.0240 -0.0258 0.00826 0.0274*
(0.619) (0.0203) (0.184) (0.0321) (0.0249) (0.0414) (0.0197) (0.0154)
Observations 478 479 474 483 483 483 483 483
Any Net Treated Net
Ever-
Treated 
Net
Blanket Shoes Clothes
Treatment Probability 0.0202 0.00845 0.0185 0.0135 0.0186 0.0336
(0.0139) (0.0101) (0.0123) (0.0312) (0.0314) (0.0271)
Sibling Treatment 0.0178** 0.00718 0.0206*** 0.0180 0.0180 0.00603
(0.00760) (0.00579) (0.00706) (0.0183) (0.0203) (0.0187)
Observations 4656 4656 4656 2028 2027 2029
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. Treatment is a binary for full protection against IDD, with 
probability of 1  
Effects of IOC Treatment on Vaccinations
Breastfeeding Delivery Vaccinations
Effects of IOC Treatment on Nutritional Investments and Neonatal Investments
Bed Nets Possessions
Table A.7: Robustness to Alternate Treatment Definitions (Full)
Polio DPT
aged 5 and over from 2004 & 2007 DHS aged 5 and over from 2007 DHS
Effects of IOC Treatment on Use of Bed Nets and Possessions